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Abstract  
Six universities from Europe, Asia and the United States participated in an evaluation of the use of 
innovation in the port logistics and maritime sector. Led by the BNP Paribas Fortis Chair in Transport, 
Logistics and Ports from the University of Antwerp, the purpose of the study was to evaluate the 
decision-making process and adoption of innovation using quantitative tools. This paper focuses on 
one of those quantitative tools, cost benefit analysis. Seventy-four separate and highly diverse 
innovation projects undertaken by private businesses were examined to determine if a traditional 
cost benefit analysis was used as part of their decision-making process. The data showed that no 
projects performed comprehensive cost benefit analysis, although for some projects limited cost 
effectiveness data were collected after the innovation was implemented. Cost benefit analysis is both 
complex and time consuming. It is designed for public sector decision-making, where societal costs 
and benefits are of concern, and where alternative policy actions are evaluated. If these innovations 
were implemented mainly as a result of internal decisions, use of cost benefit analysis would not be 
expected. The data show that 37 (50%) of the innovation projects were undertaken because of 
external influences, 21 (28.3%) were purely internal company decisions and 16 (21.6%) were 
influenced by public subsidy.  Several types of innovation projects examined in this research project 
could be candidates for a cost benefit or cost effectiveness assessment. These are projects where 
environmental benefits and costs can be quantified, or where quantifiable external benefits support 
public investment in capital costs or in an operating subsidy.  It is found that port innovation would 
benefit from more formalized methods of project assessment. 
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1 Introduction  
The BNP Paribas Fortis Chair in Transport, Logistics and Ports, hosted at the University of Antwerp led 
an international team to examine the application of innovation among port industries involved in the 
(maritime) freight supply chain. Recognizing that the literature consists primarily of descriptive case 
studies, the goal of this research was to apply four quantitative tools to evaluate the use and 
adoption of innovative technologies. Those four instruments were: 1) quantitative comparative 
analysis, 2) Delphi method and H- analysis, 3) systems of innovative approach, and 4) cost benefit 
analysis. The University of Antwerp team coordinated the overall research project which included 
researchers from the University of Genoa, University of Lisbon, University of the Aegean, University of 
Southern California (USC) and Nanyang Technological University.   
Data for 74 examples of port and supply chain innovation projects were collected by the research 
teams. Two innovation cases, the 3PL Primary Gate and the Port Single Window involved multiple 
analyses from different stakeholders resulting in 84 assessments. Thirty private port operators from 
ten countries provided data on their innovation projects. These companies represented a mix of 
terminal operators, stevedoring companies, transportation service providers, shippers and shipyards, 
along with public port authorities. The projects within the study were divided into twelve different 
types as listed below: 
1. Innovations in dredging 
2. Electronic data interchange innovation 
3. IT-innovations supporting cargo flow 
4. Cargo loading/unloading efficiencies 
5. Innovations supporting transfer of containers 
6. Reduced vehicle operating costs 
7. Innovations supporting the inland waterways system  
8. Monitoring innovation - vehicles & cargo  
9. Space innovation 
10. Inland navigation innovation within urban context 
11. Equipment innovation 
12. Management innovation 
The USC team of researchers was responsible for the reivew of cost benefit analysis (CBA) 
approaches. Examination of the data set, however, revealed that formal cost benefit analyses were 
not undertaken in connection with any of the innovation cases. Rather, limited cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) was undertaken for several projects, although this data was collected after the 
innovation project was implemented, not as a precursor to a decision to proceed with the project. 
The availability of public grant funds to support the innovation sometimes triggered the requirement 
to collect cost and cost-effectiveness data. The lack of any cost benefit data prompted the USC team 
to reexamine the data set to determine whether CBA or CEA could be useful tools in the port 
innovation decision-making process. Both cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis are 
tools for assessing whether the costs of an activity can be justified or not by its outcomes.   
 
Decision-making for maritime innovation investments: the significance of CBA and CEA 4 
 
If maritime innovators are not using CBA and are only using CEA to a limited extent, how are private 
innovators making business decisions whether or not to invest in a potential innovation? Seventy four 
of the innovation cases that involved a private company financial investment were surveyed to 
determine if the investment decision was an internal one, or whether external influences, including 
the opportunity for public funding, factored into the investment decision. This paper categorizes the 
74 innovation projects by factors that prompted innovators to undertake investments and draws 
conclusions about how the use of CBA or CEA analysis might be useful in port innovation decision-
making. 
2 Cost-benefit analysis 
After defining the term ‘cost benefit analysis’ (CBA), this section addresses the difficulties in applying 
CBA followed by some recent examples of applications. 
2.1.1 Defining CBA 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a method to consider all costs and benefits (monetary and non-
monetary, including externalities) over the life of a project. All costs and benefits are monetized, 
summed up over the life of the project, and adjusted to account for the time value of money. The 
result of this process is an estimate of net present value (NPV), the value of the stream of all benefits, 
net of the stream of all costs, in today’s currency value.  CBA requires a substantial amount of 
generated or inferred data. Literature regarding CBA generally focuses on the gathering of data and 
on the pertinence of the technique to determine the comparative ranking of alternative projects – 
usually those that are supported in some manner by the public sector (e.g. Boardman, 2006; Mishan 
and Quah, 2007; Nas, 1996). A review of the literature on applications of cost-benefit or cost-
effectiveness analysis to the port sector in the broad sense (e.g. from a port supply chain perspective) 
reveals that few academic studies have been conducted to date on this issue (Vanelslander et al., 
2015).  
CBA is a decision procedure that allows decision makers to understand the trade-offs between the full 
costs and benefits of alternative actions. It is based on the utilitarian proposition that decision makers 
should maximize collective good. Its goal is to provide a neutral and comprehensive method of 
evaluating policy proposals, a way of aligning the diverse consequences and values implied by 
collective choices along a single quantitative metric (Sinden et al., 2009). 
In practice, a CBA typically entails (a) the identification of a number of alternatives to address a 
business or policy issue; (b) the quantification and monetization of the expected stream of costs and 
benefits of each alternative over its lifetime; (c) the estimation of the Net Present Value (NPV) of each 
alternative. NPV accounts for the opportunity cost of future costs and benefits. The NPV provides a 
means for determining whether alternatives have net benefits, and for ranking alternatives. (Zerbe & 
Dively, 1994). 
CBA differs from a traditional commercial project evaluation in two ways. First, it considers costs and 
benefits to all members of society and not only the monetary expenditures and revenues of the 
company responsible for the action. Second, it adopts a social discount rate that could be different 
from the private discount rate, because it takes into account the social opportunity cost of resources 
rather than the strict financial opportunity cost (Moore et al, 2004; Moore et al, 2013). 
The US Army Corps of Engineers has been using CBA to evaluate public projects since the 1930s, but 
CBA did not become mandatory for Federal agencies until the 1980s. President Clinton (Executive 
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Order, 1993) and President Obama have restated the relevance of CBA, and have extended the scope 
of the evaluation to include distributive effects and equity concerns (Executive Order, 2011).1  
The UK requires CBA in the appraisal of transportation infrastructure projects. In contrast, the 
European Commission supports cost effectiveness analysis for evaluations of programs or projects, to 
assess the choices in the allocation of resources, to determine strategy-planning priorities and to 
conduct complex evaluations. CEA can be undertaken in the context of ex ante, intermediary or ex 
post evaluations (European Commission, 2005). 
Critics of CBA argue that it has several disadvantages. First, benefits are often difficult to quantify and 
cannot be reduced to monetary values (Harrington et al., 2009) Second, it is difficult to account for 
uncertainty (Sinden et al). Third, its complexity creates the potential for manipulation based on pre-
existing biases. (Sinden et al., 2009). Fourth, the process of discounting future benefits may be 
inappropriate for resources  (say of an endangered species) that may have increased future value. 
Finally, there is the concern that current CBA practices do not take into account that benefits and 
costs have different marginal benefits for different social groups, and, as a consequence, the results 
of CBA do not effectively represent the real effects of regulatory actions on collective welfare (Sinden 
et al. 2009). 
Supporters of the CBA approach, on the other hand, argue that many of these criticisms can be 
addressed. Proponents also contend that as a decision procedure, CBA forces agencies to think about 
the outcomes of the proposed projects and regulations and quantify the economic and 
environmental impacts with a comparable metric (Zerbe, 1998). It pushes agencies to realistically 
consider the relevance and magnitude of these outcomes. The process, they maintain, at least 
guarantees a degree of transparency and provides a consistent framework for data collection. 
Monetization, though imperfect, makes possible the aggregation of dissimilar effects and allows for 
comparison among different alternatives provided that the same monetization factors and 
assumptions are held constant across projects (Sunstein, 2001; Adler & Posner, 2006). If the method 
of performing a CBA is transparent, the monetization of different factors can be re-evaluated if new 
information arises. 
2.1.2 Difficulties in Applying CBA 
The practice of CBA produces numerous challenges. Selection of the interest rate at which future 
costs and benefits are discounted is one of the most controversial. Discounting takes into account the 
different value that society attributes to future gains and losses as compared to the value of present 
gains and losses. It is based on the principle that individuals and society value present benefits more 
than otherwise equivalent future benefits. The discount rate affects the NPV of each alternative and 
is therefore a central element for assessing each alternative’s social value,  and for identifying the 
alternative that maximizes societal welfare.  
The choice of a discount rate can favour some projects over others. Low discount rates value long 
term benefits and costs, while high discount rates place greater value on shorter term benefits and 
costs. Typically, lower discount rates are chosen if the project produces benefits far in the future. For 
example, rail improvement projects can often have useful lives stretching out 50 years, whereas other 
infrastructure projects might only have useful lives of 20 years. However, if individuals and society 
value present benefits more than future benefits, then a single discount rate does not accurately 
                                                          
1
 Projects financed from EU funds need to be supported with a cost-benefit analysis method. 
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reflect valuation over the project lifetime (Weitzman, 2001).  For this reason, the discount rate is 
actually an average of different rates for different future time intervals, leading to a future average 
rate that is lower for long lasting projects than it is for projects with a shorter useful life.  The discount 
rate is an especially important issue when considering projects that may generate benefits far into 
the future, as in the case of GHG reduction policies.  Conventional discounting reduces very long term 
benefits to near zero, while the implementation costs of such policies are born in the short term 
(Dasgupta, 2008; Gollier, 2012). 
A fundamental critique to using a discount rate is based on the notion of intergenerational justice 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2011). Although the primary driver of the discount rate is the time value of money, 
some analysts are concerned that a high discount rate may encourage actions that disadvantage 
future generations. One way of dealing with such concerns is to use alternative interest rates.  For 
example, the White House Office of Management and Budget requires US agencies to use two 
different rates (3 percent and 7 percent) that serve as an upper and lower bound of future benefits, 
and to apply the same rates to both benefits and costs. In other countries, analysts test the sensitivity 
of the results to changes in the interest rate. 
To avoid the issues with quantifying social benefits, US agencies often estimate the cost effectiveness 
of their regulatory decisions. They estimate the costs of the project but do not monetize benefits. For 
example, they may compare quantities of emissions reductions among alternatives and choose the 
one that minimizes the unit cost of pollution reduction. This approach does not work well for 
regulations and projects that affect different factors with diverging cost effectiveness ratios. 
2.1.3 Some recent applications of CBA in maritime transportation 
The cost benefit approach has been used to assess the feasibility of many transportation 
infrastructure projects (Priemus, Flyvbjerg, and van Wee, 2008), but there are few examples of CBA 
for the types of projects that were part of this study.  
One of the few examples of an extensive cost benefit analysis of emissions mitigation strategies of 
maritime transport is the EPA’s regulatory impact assessment (RIA) of its 2009 strategy to reduce 
airborne emissions of U.S. flagged large ocean going vessels with category 3 diesel engines(EPA, 
2009). 
The analysis assumed that costs borne by the private sector to comply with the new regulations will 
be passed on to the consumers and, thus, treated them as social costs. The assessment quantified 
both investment and maintenance costs. Capital investment costs were estimated only for upgrading 
the US flagged vessels. Operational costs to maintain the equipment to reduce NOx emissions were 
estimated for both domestic and international vessels. The differential price of lower sulfur fuel 
compared to the price of high sulfur fuel was also included for both domestic and international 
vessels. Future high and low sulfur prices were projected with the World Oil Refining Logistics and 
Demand (WORLD) model. 
To quantify and monetize the benefits of the strategy, the assessment focused on the benefits to 
human health of improved air quality and reduced concentrations of PM2.5 and ozone. The study 
explicitly excluded other smaller benefits, like the reduction of sulfur and nitrogen depositions and 
improved visibility using PM2.5 and NOX as proxies for total pollution.  
Quantifying and attributing a monetary value to the health effects of the strategy is a complex 
process that relies heavily on existing modeling tools and on specialized knowledge of the marine 
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transportation industry and of the health effects of criteria pollutants.2 This analysis concluded with a 
comparison of costs and benefits and claims that: “the annual benefits of the total program will range 
between $47 to $110 billion annually in 2020 using a three percent discount rate, or between $42 to 
$100 billion assuming a 7 percent discount rate, compared to estimated social costs of approximately 
$1.9 billion in that same year.” (EPA, 2009; p. 6-32). 
Other studies of port related emissions reductions strategies have a much smaller scope than EPA’s 
RIA. In order to compare different SO2 mitigation strategies in the maritime sector, Wang and Corbett 
(2007) evaluated costs and benefits of reducing SO2 emissions from ships operating along the US 
West Coast. The authors tested two different sulfur control strategies: a wide versus a narrow 
emissions control area along the coast of the Northwest United States. Additionally, they studied the 
costs and benefits of adopting two different types of low sulfur fuels (1.5% and .5% sulfur content), 
eestimating the quantity of fuel used in each area and the amount of SO2 emissions reaching land 
from each control area in the baseline conditions. They defined the costs of their strategies as the 
differential between more costly low sulfur fuels and a cheaper high sulfur fuel and calculated the 
benefits as a function of the savings in SO2 emissions and of the avoided health and environmental 
damages of SO2. Based on previous studies that estimate the monetary value of avoided SO2 
emissions, they calculated the benefit/cost ratio of the four alternatives and concluded that all the 
alternatives have a ratio larger than 1. 
Tzannatos (2010) estimated the cost/benefit ratio of reducing SO2 emissions from marine shipping in 
Greece. The study estimated SO2 yearly emissions and differential costs in the Greek seas for 
domestic passenger and freight shipping and for international shipping using fuels of different sulfur 
content. Social costs using previous research on the quantification of sulfur effects on mortality and 
morbidity and on building materials was also estimated. The analysis finds that the external benefits 
of the application of 1.5% and 1% sulfur limit to marine fuels will outweigh the increase in fuel costs. 
It also finds that the benefits associated with very low sulfur fuels (0.1%) do not outweigh their costs, 
but that SO2 scrubbers on domestic shipping vessels provide emission reductions similar to those 
attained with 0.1% sulfur fuels and their benefits outweigh the yearly cost of installation and 
maintenance. 
A limited number of studies have included the evaluation of the cost/benefit ratio of emission 
reduction devices taking into account a larger range of air emissions. Jiang and al. (2012) estimated 
the costs and benefits of sea water scrubbers (SWS). The authors first estimated a “baseline” cost of 
emissions for a typical return trip of a 5,000 Twenty-Foot-Equivalent-Unit (TEU) container ship 
between Gothenburg and Rotterdam. They used marginal external costs for emissions of SOx, NOx, 
PM2.5 and CO2 estimated by an EU-wide study and applied emission factors derived by previous 
studies for three different ship conditions: free sailing, maneuvering and berth time. They estimated 
the yearly costs of installing and maintaining SWS. They provided an estimate of their monetary 
benefits and claim that the additional cost of installing SWS on new ships can be offset by one round 
trip per year, and the additional costs of retrofitting existing vessels can be offset by two round trips 
per year. 
More recently, Jiang et al. (2014) compared the benefit/cost ratio of scrubbers and low sulfur fuels 
based on the typical return trip of a typical medium size container ship between Gothenburg and 
                                                          
2
 EPA has set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for six primary air pollutants called “crieteria pollutants”: 
NO2, Pb, SO2, CO, PM10 and PM2.5 
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Rotterdam, and concluded that low sulfur fuels’ benefit/cost ratio is far more favorable than the 
benefit/cost ratio of installing scrubbers, contingent on the price of low sulfur fuel.  
Other studies examined the cost effectiveness of alternative ways to reduce emissions from 
operations. Using similar procedures, the Port of Long Beach (Environ, 2004) and the Port of San 
Diego (Yorke Engineering, 2007), estimated the cost effectiveness of providing shoreside electrical 
power for ships to plug in (cold ironing or alternative maritime power-AMPing). The Port of Long 
Beach selected 12 vessels and berths, and compared the cost effectiveness of providing cold ironing 
facilities to each type of vessel, taking into account the effective number of yearly port calls and the 
actual docking behavior of each vessel. The study estimated the capital and maintenance costs of 
improving the electrical infrastructure at each berth and of retrofitting the vessels to receive 
shoreside power. Criteria pollutant reduction by connecting the ships to the electrical grid rather than 
using their auxiliary motors to produce electricity while docking was calculated. From the perspective 
of the steamship lines, the results showed that cold ironing is cost effective as an emissions reduction 
strategy for steamship lines whose vessels make frequent port calls and spend longer time at berth. 
However, the net economic benefit to the steamship line is highly variable and dependent upon the 
cost of bunker fuel. In addition, the study compared alternative emission reductions strategies such 
as combustion management, engine replacement, fuel replacement and exhaust treatment and 
concluded that fuel replacement would be more cost effective than any other emission reduction 
technique. 
The EPA’s Office of Transportation and Air Quality (OTAQ) evaluated the cost effectiveness of 
retrofitting nonroad equipment such as cranes and other heavy equipment with four different 
devices to reduce NOx and Particulate Matter (PM) emissions. Using NONROAD, a proprietary model 
that EPA has developed to estimate nonroad mobile equipment, and information on operation times, 
the study estimated baseline emissions of NOx and PM for each type of nonroad diesel equipment. It 
assessed the abatement potential of the four different strategies using data from a Retrofit 
Technology Verification Program run by the agency. It then estimated capital costs for the different 
strategies. The projected emission reductions over the lifetime of the equipment and cost 
effectiveness of the four strategies was quantified. Results showed that upgrade kits for NOx 
reductions and selective catalytic reduction systems are more cost effective than diesel oxidation 
catalysts and catalyzed diesel particulate filters for every nonroad diesel equipment category (EPA 
2007). 
It is appropriate to ask why CBA is so seldom used in the maritime sector. Possible explanations 
include:  
 The maritime sector is mainly private, and the calculus for private decisions is based upon 
costs and benefits to the firm. Thus there is little justification for using a decision tool that is 
costly, complicated, and oriented to cases where government funding or societal costs and 
benefits are involved. 
 Until relatively recently, the maritime sector has not been a target of government regulation. 
Thus policies that might trigger a CBA were uncommon. The studies reviewed are illustrative: 
all deal with emissions reductions strategies from the last decade. 
2.1.4 CBA and port innovations 
The following section reviews general considerations about the societal impacts of port innovation 
and their consideration in the decision as to whether a CBA should be performed.  
Innovations may be implemented as a test or proof of concept of a particular strategy to address a 
problem, as in the examples of emissions reductions strategies described in the previous section. 
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However, the anticipated benefits of such a project are in its scalability for wider implementation. 
The test case may be more costly (new projects have high initial costs) and hence a CBA may show 
lower or negative net benefits relative to what larger scale implementation would show. In addition, 
innovation is by definition uncertain, and in a CBA context, the cost/benefit stream would have to be 
adjusted for this risk.  
 
A CBA may have a different definition of the “universe” for which benefits are assessed. In theory, a 
CBA should include all benefits and costs no matter where they occur. However in practice this does 
not always occur. A CBA may include only benefits that accrue to one or more countries, or to a 
specific locality. Typically, the universe of benefits will correspond to the interests of the sponsoring 
agency. For example, if funds come from the EU, the benefits must occur within the EU to offset the 
costs. Practice in the US is similar. As the vast majority of projects in the United States for which CBA 
is performed have received federal funding, it is common for benefits or costs that accrue outside the 
United States to remain unquantified. When boundaries are placed on what costs and benefits are 
counted, the true net benefits may be quite different. For example, a US-based CBA may count 
revenue associated with cargo shipments diverted from Canada to the US as a benefit, when in fact 
such a diversion is actually a transfer, with no net benefit to society as a whole. 
 
Emissions benefits are a key component of CBA for the transport sector in both the United States and 
Europe, however the specific quantification of benefits is distinct. In the United States, NOx and 
carbon monoxide, the key precursors of ground level ozone, are the principle targets for emission 
reductions. More recently, the value of PM10 emission reductions have grown as the connection 
between particulates and cancer rates has been more conclusively demonstrated (Hamra et al. 2014). 
CO2 benefits are more frequently the central focus of European CBA with C02 sometimes used as a 
proxy for all emissions.  
 
The rate at which future projects are discounted is often key to whether the benefit cost ratio is 
above one, and hence whether the project merits further consideration. For government projects, the 
choice of discount rate depends on assumptions regarding the appropriate social cost of capital. 
Another factor that influences net benefits is the durability of the innovation or project. If the project 
is the installation of cranes that allow for twin 40’ lift capacity with a useful life of twenty years, all of 
the costs and benefits are amortized over the twenty years. This shortens the stream of benefits, 
making it more difficult to yield net benefits than in the case of a project with a longer useful lifetime 
– say 50 years – all else equal.  
 
Cost effectiveness analysis is more typically used in cases where one or more outputs cannot be 
monetized in a manner that is agreed upon by all involved parties. The most common occurrence of 
cost effectiveness analysis is in studying medical outcomes. For example, if intervention A costing 10 
million Euro will reduce strokes in humans by 1000 incidents per year, a definitive statement can be 
made about the cost per abated stroke. However there may be no agreed upon measure to monetize 
the benefit, i.e. how valuable to society is the value of one avoided stroke, on average? In these 
cases, the benefits simply remain non-monetized. Cost effectiveness analysis was originally 
developed by the military to compare effectiveness of similar interventions where the specific 
benefit, e.g. added security, is very difficult to monetize.  
 
In most cases, the innovations associated with ports are more readily quantifiable. Furthermore, the 
outputs of innovations typically have agreed upon per unit values such as an innovation reducing CO2 
by a specific number of metric tons. Yet there may be innovations that create impacts for which no 
per unit value has been reliably established, such as new dredging techniques that result in lower 
rates of turbidity in the surrounding water.  
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As maritime innovations are by their nature experimental, the level of benefit is usually the biggest 
uncertainty. For example, we might not know if a particular innovation will produce a 30% labor 
savings or only a 10% labor savings, or whether another innovation will produce a substantial 
emissions reduction or only a modest emission reduction. Conventional forms of both CBA and CEA 
have limited capacity to consider uncertainty (Graham, 1981; Bock and Truck, 2011). One obvious 
approach is to use a range of estimates for key parameters. More importantly, the learning provided 
by testing an innovation may be its greatest benefit, something that would be very difficult to 
monetize. CEA also has weaknesses for projects with uncertain outcomes, because there is no 
straightforward way to estimate the cost per unit outcome of an uncertain process.  
 
3 Cost effectiveness analysis 
The EC (2005) states that the main purpose of cost-effectiveness analysis (hereafter CEA) is to identify 
the economically most efficient way to fulfill an objective. In contrast to CBA, CEA considers two 
elements: the cost of achieving one objective and the level of achievement of that objective. In other 
words, a cost-effectiveness analysis generates a ratio between the inputs in monetary terms and the 
outcomes in non-monetary quantitative terms (Išoraite, 2005). The National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (2013) defines cost-effectiveness analysis as an economic study in which 
consequences of different interventions are measured using a single outcome, usually in natural units 
(for example, life-years gained, deaths avoided). Alternative interventions are then compared in 
terms of cost per unit of effectiveness. 
The cost-effectiveness method is appropriate for the evaluation of actions in which expected 
outcomes are clearly identified and whose direct or indirect costs are easily measurable. If the 
outcome of a project cannot be clearly defined, or if homogeneous and quantifiable units cannot be 
determined, the use of cost-effectiveness analysis should be avoided (EC, 2005). For example, when 
an investment aims at reducing the amount of air pollutants which are released in the atmosphere, 
the effectiveness criteria for that investment could be the decrease in the daily average of the air 
pollutants emitted. In the rail transport sector. Mulvey (1979) creates a ranking of Amtrak routes 
which should be modernized by using a cost-effectiveness analysis. The same author compares the 
cost of upgrading the Amtrak service and the expected number of passengers. Rufolo (1986) creates a 
cost-effectiveness analysis taking into account the cost of introduction of articulated buses in 
comparison with the time gained for boarding of the passengers. Wang (2004) calculates the cost 
effectiveness of mobile source emission control measures by dividing the total costs by the total 
emissions which are being reduced. Barkan (2004) determines the cost effectiveness of a new 
refueling system by comparing the installation cost of the new equipment with the yearly volume of 
fuel saved from spilling. 
4 The Decision-Making Process Used in the Innovation 
Cases 
A traditional CBA was not used by the companies or organizations that implemented the 74 
innovation cases. The traditional factors that promote the use of CBA were not present in most cases. 
These factors include public investments, projects mandated to reduce externalities via regulation, or 
major projects that include consideration of multiple alternatives.   A review of the literature supports 
the finding that port-related decisions for innovation cases are rarely based on formal cost-benefit 
analysis. CBA is a complicated and costly process that requires experts to do correctly.  
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A CBA becomes more complex if an agency seeks to consider uncertainty explicitly, e.g. the 
consideration of multiple contingent outcomes as opposed to using a risk adjusted interest rate as a 
proxy for uncertainty. Thus, the type of CBA required to evaluate innovation projects is the most 
sophisticated type of CBA. Finally, since most of these innovations were made by private companies, 
the meaningful decision metric was about costs versus expected return on investment; and therefore 
did not call for the consideration of external costs. 
Most cases had no associated cost-effectiveness data: limited cost-effectiveness data was available 
for 8 of the 74 cases. Three of these 8 cases had public subsidies which may have influenced the type 
of data collected and also prompted public disclosure of the data. In these cases, the government 
innovation champion wanted to showcase the innovation as a model for others to follow. For 
example, the cost of constructing and operating a seawater emissions scrubber on an APL 
containership was tested to compare the cost effectiveness of complying with an IMO emission 
control area by using higher cost compliant fuels or lower cost non-compliant fuels with scrubber 
treatment. 
In the cases where limited quantitative assessment of the innovation was undertaken, the data was 
collected concurrent with or after implementation of the innovation. Thus, collecting cost-
effectiveness data was one objective of carrying out the innovation. Thus, this data could potentially 
be used as an input to perform a CBA for future implementation of the innovation.  Another potential 
obstacle is that companies may not be forthcoming with their cost-effectiveness data for proprietary 
reasons.  
With little quantitative data on cost-effectiveness, the 74 cases were reexamined to develop a 
framework for the decision-making. What prompted these 74 organizations to undertake these 
innovations? If these innovations were purely an internal decision of the firm, we would not expect 
CBA or CEA to be used.  If the innovation was a response to some form of public intervention,  CBA or 
CEA would be more likely. Each innovation was categorized as either: 1) an internal decision made by 
the company for its own profit or efficiency motives; 2) an internal decision but influenced by 
external forces that created incentives or disincentives for the company; or 3) a response to a 
significant level of public subsidy. The data indicates that 37 (50%) of the projects were undertaken 
because of external influences, 21 (28.3%) were purely internal company decisions and 16 (21.6%) 
were influenced by public subsidy. The public subsidies were also actions undertaken by governments 
to be responsive to community or environmental concerns. Therefore, of the 74 cases, 53 (71.6%) 
(category 2 and 3) were influenced by external forces. This suggests that the port industry might 
consider being more proactive in examining innovations rather than, as in some cases examined, 
waiting until community and environmental pressures make innovation a necessity. There may be 
benefits that companies could realize by use of cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis either to be 
more proactive in implementing innovation, to present a compelling case for government grants or 
subsidies, or in the case that the benefit/cost ratio would not be positive, to demonstrate to 
stakeholders why a particular innovation is not being implemented. Table 1 provides a summary of 
the decision-making factors that were considerations in the 74 innovation projects.  
 
Table 1: Decision-making Factors
3
 
Category Examples Objective Decision 
process 
Number of cases 
1 Internal decision, no Terminal Increase Firm 21 or 28.3 % 
                                                          
3
 See the appendix for individual project categories. 
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external incentives or 
disincentives 
appointment 
system 
Automated 
stacking cranes 
productivity, 
throughput, 
efficiency 
2 Strategic internal 
decision, external 
incentives or 
disincentives, no 
public subsidies or 
regulation 
Use AF dock 
equipment as 
part of green port 
program 
Restore natural 
habitat as part of 
green port 
program 
Increase public 
support, pre-empt 
regulation, protect 
business interests 
Firm, 
sometimes 
with 
stakeholder 
input 
36 or 50 % 
3 Responsive decision 
to public subsidies or 
regulation (responses 
to subsidies different 
from responses to 
regs) 
Subsidies for 
short-haul barge 
Scrubbers on 
ships 
Reduce 
externalities, 
comply with 
regulatory 
requirements 
Firm, 
government, 
other 
stakeholders 
16 or 21.6 % 
 
5 Are There Cases Where CBA or CEA Could Have Been 
Used?  
 
As illustrated through the previous sections, CBA is not a tool for all applications. Some projects do 
not have sufficient data inputs, whereas for others the potential outputs are too speculative. In 
addition, the amount of data depends on capability and/or willingness of an agency to collect. Given 
that formal cost benefit analysis was not performed for the projects that were assessed as part of this 
study, we instead limit our discussion to the general types of projects that were included in the 
analysis that are most conducive to cost benefit analysis in order to illustrate the considerations that 
would go into future cost-benefit applications.  
 
The projects in the study are divided into twelve major types. While exceptions exist, we have 
identified the four types of innovation that are best suited for the implementation of CBA. Projects in 
the other categories will tend to be assessed via internal business decisions that do not necessitate 
nor facilitate the use of CBA. The categories for which CBA is viable and their reasons for inclusion are 
described below.  
  
Project Type 1: Innovation in Dredging - For dredging case studies, the use of CBA may be 
appropriate, because dredging is an activity that has substantial impact on the natural environment. 
Therefore, an assessment of externalities associated with the innovation would help to determine 
whether the economic benefits of dredging offset the environmental impacts. CBA is not typically 
performed in connection with dredging innovations in Europe, because it is often a private activity. In 
contrast, dredging in the US is performed by the US Army Corps of Engineers, and CBA has been 
required for all proposed dredging projects. The US experience suggests that the use of CBA does not 
mean that only projects that pass a benefit/cost test are implemented. The Army Corps has been 
criticized for advocating large projects with questionable net benefits (GAO, 2006)  
 
Those dredging operations that are best candidates for benefit cost analysis are those that have an 
external benefit, for example dredging that has a comparatively lower impact on the benthic 
environment could be assessed to have a positive overall BCA even if it resulted in higher per unit 
cost. The same calculus is used for dredge spoil disposal innovations. When considering the specific 
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dredging innovations included in the study, the “Wild Dragon” dredging technology would be a logical 
candidate for CBA because its benefits in terms of air emissions and economic gains would need to be 
assessed against additional capital cost.  
 
Project Type 4: Technological innovation supporting the transfer of containers from one mode to 
another – CBA is often proposed for technological advances that improve the ability of containers to 
be transferred from one mode to another. There are a number of policy impacts from improvements 
to intermodal transferability that might produce positive externalities. For example, greater ability to 
transfer between modes may improve market access and thereby decrease monopolization of certain 
markets by certain modes. In addition, these innovations can allow the supply chain to make 
increased use of carbon-efficient modes like rail and barge in lieu of trucking. Environmental benefits 
that derive from the improved efficiency can also be readily monetized given standard monetization 
factors for criteria pollutants and CO2.  
 
These types of technological innovations are also a good candidate for CBA due to their high upfront 
capital cost that are often shared by public and private participants. In addition, the investment in 
increased intermodal capability may impact efficiency in other parts of the supply chain. For example, 
the implementation of an on-dock rail system to facilitate truck to rail modal shift may have 
undeniable benefits for supply chain efficiency, yet the consumption of terminal land as well as high 
capital construction costs must also be weighed.  
 
Project Type 5: Technological Innovation to Reduce Vehicle Operating Costs – The United States and 
Europe have instituted policies intended to reduce vehicle fuel consumption that also tend to reduce 
vehicle operating costs. Yet, the impacts of these policies can ripple through society in sometimes 
unforeseen ways. CBA has the potential to help policymakers choose from multiple alternative 
strategies.  
 
Truck vehicle operating costs are highly variable and are based on payload weight, cost of fuel, 
aerodynamic drag, rolling resistance, operating speed and many other factors. When fuel costs rose 
dramatically in the early 2000s, trucking companies experimented with a number of techniques to 
reduce their fuel consumption, many of which were monitored and assessed by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency. Some of these strategies were innocuous and may have even had other positive 
externalities (for example the installation of speed governors to prevent trucks from exceeding the 
speed limit). Other innovations, such as the replacement of paired tires on heavy trucks with single 
wide tires raised concern that the internal high cost of fuel to the trucking company was being 
exchanged for increased external costs in terms of pavement damage and accelerated rutting. The 
difficulty in performing CBA for these innovations was the variable nature of future fuel costs versus 
the known upfront capital costs of vehicle modification.  Also, the long term external costs are 
difficult to estimate. Outside of trucking, examples of fuel cost reduction strategies came through the 
pilot implementation of hybrid locomotives and tug boats. Regardless of mode, modifications that 
reduced fuel consumption could also be assessed according to their impacts on emissions. Generally, 
the trade-offs of capital investment against marginal gains in operating cost are easiest to measure in 
trucks that perform long haul service, as slight improvements in fuel consumption, aerodynamic drag 
and rolling resistance are easier to measure at highway speeds than for trucks that perform local 
delivery service. 
 
The other major component of vehicle operating costs that can be reduced is labor costs. The 
principle technique that has been proposed for reducing truck labor costs is the introduction of long-
combination vehicles (LCVs) that allow one driver to carry two or three times the cargo without a net 
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increase in axle weight. Most areas of the US and Europe prohibit LCVs due to concerns about their 
safety, impact on the highway system, and potential for diverting cargo from rail.  
 
With respect to the specific case studies described in the report, the CNG truck deployment study is 
an example in which a CBA could theoretically have been performed. The project had an internal 
economic justification given that the cost of natural gas was lower than the equivalent price of diesel 
fuel. The projects external benefits are tied to superior CO2 performance.  
 
Project Type 6: Technological innovations supporting inland waterways – Inland waterway 
transportation is often the most carbon friendly mode of transportation. It is also the mode whose 
market share is often most precarious due to sharp competition with freight rail, particularly in the 
United States. For this reason, governments are often willing to subsidize innovations that improve 
the ability of inland waterways to compete and gain market share, even if the benefits of the 
innovation do not exceed the costs in the short term. While the inland waterway system is well 
developed for bulk and containerized goods in Europe, the U.S. system is still limited to the handling 
of bulk cargo in most markets. Therefore, U.S. agencies have shown a willingness in the past to 
subsidize services that handle non-traditional cargoes such as containers in order to help establish 
the market and also to offset prior subsidies that were received by other modes. Subsidies are also 
required because the slow speed for inland waterway transportation imposes additional inventory 
costs on shippers, which may mean that the price needed to induce modal shift must be below that 
of other modes. In addition to benefits from emissions and reduced congestion, modal shift to inland 
waterways can also produce safety benefits when carrying hazardous chemicals that would otherwise 
move over land. As is the case with many low probability, high impact events these benefits from 
averted accidents are often difficult to quantify. CBA would help to determine the level of subsidy 
justified, given environmental and safety benefits. 
 
Conclusions 
Cost-benefit analysis is a powerful but complex tool for informing public policy decisions. Although 
the cases reviewed in the BNP project were often motivated by external concerns, few were initiated 
by the public sector, involved public funds, or otherwise would justify a comprehensive CBA. Thus, it 
is not surprising that we observed no cases of CBA.  
 
Many innovations could be described as experiments or proofs of concept. They are intended to 
demonstrate that a new practice or strategy can be implemented. We note that some examples of 
the use of cost-effectiveness analysis were for innovations that tested technology, with the purpose 
of determining whether the technology was worth pursuing for broader implementation. CBA and 
CEA often have difficulty in accounting for uncertainty, which makes the process particularly 
challenging for innovation projects. 
 
CBA is not a simple process, and the decision to undergo a CBA should not be taken lightly. Of the 
twelve project types reviewed for this study, four types were determined to be conducive to CBA. 
Even within these project types, the decision to undergo a CBA is reliant on establishing a connection 
to external costs and benefits.  
 
The collected innovation cases overall had very limited quantitative data on costs or outcomes. It 
would appear that port innovation would benefit from more formal methods of assessment and 
evaluation. This would enable instances where CBA or CEA could be applied to be more readily 
identified and the results of the analyses to be more broadly compared.  
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Appendix 
 
Type of operator Innovation
1 Internal decision, no external 
incentives or disincentives
2 Strategic internal decision, external 
incentives or disincentives, no public 
subsidies or regulation
3 Responsive decision to public 
subsidies or regulation (responses 
to subsidies different from 
responses to regs)
objective:
Increase productivity, throughput, 
efficiency
Increase public support, pre-empt 
regulation, protect business interests
Reduce externalities, comply with 
regulatory requirements
decision process: Firm Firm, sometimes with stakeholder input Firm, government, other stakeholders
Ship yard
DODO (dynamic operation in dredging and 
offshore)
x- support from Dutch Ministry not 
enough to influence decision. 
Ship yard
Dredge pumps (series of different pumps, 
flexible combination of certain 
components)
x
Ship yard
Flexible spud wagon (cutdredger extended 
to work at sea)
x
Ship yard
Wild dragon (new system to suit a certain 
type of soil)
x
Terminal operator Port community system Portnet x
Port authority/port 
administration
SEAGHA - port community system x
Port authority/port 
administration
APCS x
Shipping agent 1 Port Single Window x
Shipping agent 2 Port Single Window x
Terminal Operator Port Single Window x
Lisbon port 
Administration
Port Single Window x
Sines port 
Administration
Port Single Window x
Customs Port Single Window x
Leixoes port 
Administration
Port Single Window x
Software Developer 
Consultant
Port Single Window x
Terminal operator Administration x
Terminal operator E-freight system "E-port" x
Breakbulk terminal
APCS case: central port community system 
for breakbulk (initiative from the port)
x
Breakbulk terminal
Beroepsvereniging (KVBG)(goes hand in 
hand with AE1)
x
Forwarder
IT data management) exchange data in 
smooth and efficient way
x
Shipping company e-transit (previous to the extended gate) x
Shipping company Extended-GATE 1.0 x
Shipping company Extended-GATE 2.0 x
Shipping company Extended-GATE 3.0 x
Inland terminal
Paperless Customs flow: import - extended 
gate up to the end consumer
x
Inland terminal
Pre-notification deepsea terminals 
ANTWERPEN
x
Inland terminal
Pre-notification deepsea terminals 
ROTTERDAM
x
Inland terminal Digital CMR x
Port Operator 
(Concessionaire)
3PL - Primary Gate of Leixões Port x
Terminal operator 3PL - Primary Gate of Leixões Port x
Terminal operator Vado "Port gate" x
Terminal operator Container terminal: landside x
Innovation in dredging
Electronic data interchange innovation
IT innovation supporting the cargo flow
xInland terminal Port Wide Lighter Schedule Port of Antwerp
xInland terminal Corridor management system
Inland terminal Expansion OCR capabilities x
x
x
Inland terminal
Paperless Customs flow:  Export - paperless 
until  deepsea terminal
Inland terminal
Paperless Customs flow: import - paperless 
NCTS pilot (Port of Antwerp)
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Type of operator Innovation
1 Internal decision, no external 
incentives or disincentives
2 Strategic internal decision, external 
incentives or disincentives, no public 
subsidies or regulation
3 Responsive decision to public 
subsidies or regulation (responses 
to subsidies different from 
responses to regs)
objective:
Increase productivity, throughput, 
efficiency
Increase public support, pre-empt 
regulation, protect business interests
Reduce externalities, comply with 
regulatory requirements
decision process: Firm Firm, sometimes with stakeholder input Firm, government, other stakeholders
Shipping corporation Bulk carrier self-loading/unloading cranes x
Terminal operator Automated Stacking Cranes x
Breakbulk terminal 2 Heavy Cranes x
Shipping company S-BEND on LPG carriers x
Breakbulk terminal All-weather terminal x
Port authority/port 
administration
All-weather terminal x
Breakbulk terminal All-weather terminal x
Breakbulk terminal All-weather terminal 1 x
Breakbulk terminal All-weather terminal 2 x
Breakbulk terminal All-weather terminal 3 x
Breakbulk terminal All-weather terminal 4 x
Terminal operator Tandemlift operations x
Trucking company ECO Combi x
Trucking company Van hool ECO Chassis x
Intermodal operator
New logistics intermodal door to door 
transport
Inland terminal Barge slots x
Terminal operator Straddle carriers (from diesel to CNG)
x were doing project anyway- applied 
for subsidy after decision made
Breakbulk terminal Vans from diesel to CNG x (pre-empt reg)
Trucking company CNG Class 8 Heavy Duty Drayage Truck x
Existing shipping line 
(Inland barge)
Barge heavy lift Ro-Ro hybride x
New shipping line 
(Inland barge)
Palet shuttle barge - PSB x
Terminal operator Weighbridges x (reg.)
Terminal operator
Advanced Gate Automation and FATS (Full  
Automated Truck System):
x
Trucking company
Platform EuroTransCom (import export + re-
use)
x
Innovation supporting efficiency in loading/unloading
Technological innovation supporting the transfer of containers from one mode to another
Technological innovation - reducing operating vehicle costs
Technological innovations supporting inland waterways
Monitoring innovation - vehicles & cargo
xInland terminal BCTN Portal with clients
Breakbulk terminal Autotrakker x
x
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Type of operator Innovation
1 Internal decision, no external 
incentives or disincentives
2 Strategic internal decision, external 
incentives or disincentives, no public 
subsidies or regulation
3 Responsive decision to public 
subsidies or regulation (responses 
to subsidies different from 
responses to regs)
objective:
Increase productivity, throughput, 
efficiency
Increase public support, pre-empt 
regulation, protect business interests
Reduce externalities, comply with 
regulatory requirements
decision process: Firm Firm, sometimes with stakeholder input Firm, government, other stakeholders
Terminal operator Inland terminal x
Inland terminal CY Meerhout x
Transferium x
Modal shift (ROC) x
Modal shift (collaboration with Beverdonk) x
Offshore Single Point Mooring x
Inland transport 
operator
Distribution urbaine x
Inland transport 
operator
Distribution urbanie de voiture x
Container broker 
agency
Foldable container x
Container broker 
agency
SEA 45 x
Container broker 
agency
10\6 container x (subs)
Inland terminal Empty equipment x
Shipping corporation Emission scrubber on APL containership x (sub)
Liner carrier Efficiency leadership programme x (reg)(maybe subs.)
Terminal operator Terminal carbon footprint tracking x (reg)(maybe subs.)
Port authority/port 
administration
Carbon footprint assessment of port of 
piraeus
x
Breakbulk terminal Carbon footprint assessment of Starbulk x
Transport hub
Container innovation
Management innovation
Inland terminal
Shipper
Trucking company
Inland navigation innovation within urban context
Space innovation
x
